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I. Introduction
In recent years, along with a great expansion in foreign trade, there has
been a concomitant boom in U.S. litigation involving foreign parties. In-
creasingly, U.S. courts have been faced with foreign defendants who are
properly subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and maintain potentially
discoverable materials in a foreign country.' The courts and lawyers in-
volved in transnational litigation have consequently been faced with the
procedural question of how to obtain discovery from a foreign party, in light
of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, which sets forth procedures for the use, by the U.S.
courts, of the judicial assistance of a foreign court, and a foreign legal
system, which views American-style discovery hostilely.
One recent illustration is Falzon v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft.2
In 1974, the plaintiffs were travelling in their Volkswagen microbus when it
suddenly swerved sharply and crashed into a bridge abutment leaving the
*Mark J. Sadoff, Wayne State University Law School, Class of 1986. I would like to thank
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1. This article concerns itself solely with countries which are signatories (Contracting States)
to the Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (entered into force
between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany, June 26, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Evidence Convention]. The article stresses the gathering of evidence for use in U.S. judicial
proceedings from countries with a civil law tradition. For an article describing U.S. procedures
when a foreign court is seeking evidence in the U.S. see Weiner, In Search of International
Evidence: A Lawyer's Guide Through the United States Department of Justice, 58 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 60 (1982).
2. No. 77-722-371 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County).
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parents paraplegic and seriously injuring their three children. Suit was
brought in 1977 against Volkswagenwerk A.G. (VWAG) and other defend-
ants on theories of negligence, breach of warranties, and strict liability.3
In the course of discovery, the plaintiffs issued notices for the depositions
of thirteen employees of VWAG to take place at the VWAG plant in
Wolfsburg, Federal Republic of Germany. VWAG moved to quash the
depositions on grounds of violations of federal law and of the Evidence
Convention. On September 5, 1980, the Wayne County Circuit Court
4
ordered the depositions to go forward with contingency plans to take the
testimony at the U.S. Consulate in Hamburg if the parties did not agree to
take the depositions in Wolfsburg.
VWAG sought relief from the orders from the Michigan courts. Due to
the failure of the Michigan courts to act, VWAG applied to the U.S.
Supreme Court for a stay of discovery pending disposition of the appeal in
the Michigan courts. On August 23, 1982, the stay was granted.
The Supreme Court of Michigan then denied VWAG's application for
leave to appeal.6 Plaintiffs again filed notices of depositions to take place in
Wolfsburg, and VWAG applied to Michigan courts and the U.S. Supreme
Court for stays of the discovery orders. Again, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted a stay pending action by the Michigan courts; 7 stating "that there
was a substantial chance that the applicant would prevail, and that the injury
resulting from a denial of the stay would be irreparable." 8 The Michigan
court again denied the application for leave to appeal, and for a third time,
VWAG appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally on February 2, 1984,
following an official statement by the U.S. government that, regardless of
the outcome of the court of appeals, the depositions would not be taken by
consular officials, 9 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by VWAG.10
Using Falzon as a starting place and general example, this article will
explore the use and misuse of the Evidence Convention in the U.S. courts.
The article will examine problems which the U.S. courts have dealt with in
applying the Evidence Convention in light of U.S.-style discovery and the
mistakes the courts have made in analyzing these disputes. The article will
also offer "peaceful" solutions to the problems caused by the conflict of
procedures. Inherent in both sides are the arguments best used to block the
3. Id. at Complaint.
4. Farmer, J., Wayne County Circuit Court.
5. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, No. A-191 (Burger, J., Circuit Justice).
6. 417 Mich. 889 (1983).
7. 461 U.S. 1303 (1983) (O'Connor, J., Circuit Justice).
8. 461 U.S., at 1304.
9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 412,
413 (1984) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief].
10. 104 S. Ct. 1260, reh'g denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3757 (1984).
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application of either the Federal Rules or the Evidence Convention. Finally,
problems with the proposed solutions and responses to those problems will
be discussed. The position is taken that in transnational litigation, where
the parties are nationals of Contracting States to the Evidence Convention,
the Convention must, as a matter of comity, be the avenue of first resort
in the gathering of evidence abroad. Specifically, in the case of depositions,
the Evidence Convention is the exclusive means, except in a limited number
of situations.
II. Problems with Application of the Evidence
Convention by U.S. Courts
The issue presented in Falzon has been addressed on only a handful of
occasions by other U.S. courts. Unfortunately for international judicial
cooperation, the majority of the courts have reached a result similar to that
of the Michigan trial court. Equally unfortunately, the majority of these
decisions have been based upon errors in interpretation of the Evidence
Convention and its application, or upon jingoistic applications of U.S.
discovery rules.
A. RESTRICTIONS OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER PARTIES
One of the concerns raised in these cases is that the application of the
Convention will restrict personal jurisdiction and all that flows from it. This
point was strongly emphasized by the Fifth Circuit in In reAnschuetz & Co.,
GmbH,1 the first U.S. Court of Appeals decision addressing problems
similar to those raised in Falzon. In Anschuetz, a German third-party
defendant, over whom the U.S. District Court had proper jurisdiction, was
ordered to produce eleven employees for depositions in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. The court rejected the claims of Anschuetz and the U.S.
Department of Justice that ordering depositions in Germany without pro-
ceeding under the Evidence Convention constituted a violation of German
judicial sovereignty and international law. 12 In rejecting the solutions of
11. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Auth., No. 85-98,754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.
1985); see also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the
District of Iowa, No. 85-1695, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted June 9, 1986
[hereinafter cited as S.N.I.A.]; and Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Virginia Walker,
No. 85-99, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (April 21, 1986), cert.
vacated (June 9, 1986).
12. The position of the U.S. government changed subsequent to the brief in Falzon. In his
brief as Amicus Curiae in Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1332 (1985), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 286 (1984), the Solicitor General asserted
that the U.S. courts had every right to order discovery to proceed in a foreign country given the
SPRING 1986
662 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
other jurisdictions,' 3 the court stated that "none of the cases . . . indicate
• ..that the purpose of the Convention was to restrict the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction by United States courts over foreign nationals prop-
erly before it." 1
4
The court's contention is valid in an absolute sense, i.e., the Evidence
Convention does not purport to limit the jurisdiction of any nation. This has
been clearly recognized in all cases addressing the applicability of the
Convention. In a few cases, such as Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American
Pfauter Corp., Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines and Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court (VWAG II), 15 the courts have
held, however, as a matter of judicial self-restraint and international comity,
that the U.S. party should first attempt to seek discovery using the proce-
dures of the Evidence Convention.1 6 This latter approach, discussed in more
detail infra, seems to be the more compelling approach for the U.S. courts to
take.
B. MUTUALITY OF THE
CONVENTION'S PROCEDURES
Another concern expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Anschuetz was that
U.S. parties would be put at an extreme disadvantage if forced to use the
Evidence Convention while foreign litigants were free to use the more
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules. Following the court's
view-the extraterritorial application of the Federal Rules-in this matter,
consent of the host state. It distinguished Falzon by pointing out that the Federal Republic of
Germany limited its consent to discovery to means circumscribed by the Evidence Convention.
Thus, only discovery orders which conformed to the Evidence Convention could be allowed in
Falzon. Club Med at 1338, n. 10.
13. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981) [hereinafter cited as VWA G Il]; see also Schroeder v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. I11. 1983); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American
Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
14. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 606.
15. See supra note 13.
16. General Electric v. North Star International, 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 207, 209 (N.D. I11.
1984); Philadelphia Gear, supra note 13 at 61; Schroeder, supra note 13 at 17,223; VWAG 11,
supra note 13 at 857. See also Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d
238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Th. Goldschmidt AG v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App. 1
Dist. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492 (W. Va. 1985).
In Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985) (Burnett, U.S. Magistrate), the court, while
generally supporting the analysis of the Anschuetz court as to the applicability of the Evidence
Convention where the evidence to be discovered is located in the U.S., stated that "the Hague
Evidence Convention is not rendered inapplicable by a Federal district court having in perso-
nam jurisdiction over a ... defendant, where the endeavor is to take the ... deposition of the
German national within the geographic boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany." Id.
at 48.
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however, could lead to even more disastrous results for U.S. litigants.17 This
is due to the intrusion upon the judicial sovereignty caused by such an
application of the U.S. rules of procedure and the legal system they reflect.
In contrast, requiring U.S. parties to proceed under the Evidence conven-
tion may lead to greater foreign compliance with U.S. discovery requests.
By expressing sensitivity to the concerns of foreign judicial officials and a
desire to cooperate, U.S. parties and judicial authorities will enhance the
foreign court's willingness to provide the requested information. This is due
in part to the fact that "the locus of the evidence, not the nationality of the
parties, is the critical territorial factor."' 8 To equalize access to discoverable
materials, the court may require that the foreign litigant be restricted in the
use of U.S. discovery procedures. 19
Earlier attempts to force U.S. discovery requests on foreign parties led to
the passage of "blocking" statutes. 20 By taking an antagonistic and national-
istic approach to the problem, U.S. courts have essentially shot themselves,
and U.S. litigants, present and future, in the foot.
C. WAIVER OF "CONVENTIONAL" PROCEDURES
BY THE FOREIGN PARTY
The U.S. courts have further decided that by failing to raise the Hague
Convention at the beginning of discovery, or following the first discovery
request, the foreign party waives the right to assert the exclusivity of the
Convention's procedures at a later time. 21 Although this analysis is unper-
suasive in theory, it has been adopted by some courts.22 There is no power of
17. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 606.
18. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence
Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMl L. REV. 733, 783 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Oxman]. See also International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
19. Oxman, supra note 18 at 783. Oxman points out "[lt must be recalled that the reason for
using cooperative methods for securing evidence is to accommodate the interests of a foreign
state in a rational and ordered system of territorial sovereignties, not to promote the conve-
nience of litigants. Id. at 784, n. 137. In Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce
Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court, although
sensitive to the possible intrusions on French judicial sovereignty, ordered discovery under the
Federal Rules because the foreign plaintiff would be put at an unfair advantage otherwise. Id. at
32.
20. See generally, Great Britain: Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 c. 11 s. 1-4;
France: Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980 Relating to Communication of Economic, Commer-
cial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons, [1980] J.O. 1799, English version with commentary, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1981).
21. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 607; see also Cooper Industries v. British Aerospace, 102
F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360
(D. Vt. 1984).
22. Supra note 21.
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waiver granted the foreign party under the Convention. "The failure of one
litigant to demand compliance with the convention cannot divest the foreign
nation of its sovereign judicial rights under the convention. The convention
may be waived only by the nation whose judicial sovereignty would thereby
be infringed upon."' 23 The right to waive the procedures of the Evidence
Convention in Anschuetz and Falzon belonged to the Federal Republic of
Germany, not to the individual foreign litigants. Thus, in the absence of
such waiver by the host state, the foreign party may, at his or her discretion,
object or not object to "un-Conventional" procedures.
Of course where both parties to the litigation and the foreign witness all
agree to direct discovery, no issue of the use of the Evidence Convention is
raised and such discovery will not be barred.24 This is not because there is no
intrusion on the judicial sovereignty of the host country, but rather because
no issue will be presented to the court.2 5 If any of the parties, witnesses, or
governments concerned oppose direct discovery, it is incumbent upon the
U.S. court to require compliance with the Evidence Convention as an
avenue of first resort.2 6
D. THE USE OF THE CONVENTION TO
SHIELD FOREIGN INFORMATION
The court in Anschuetz was also concerned that requiring resort to the
Evidence Convention would result in the shielding of pertinent information
and documents from the U.S. courts. At the root of this argument lies the
court's reasoning that the procedures of the Evidence Convention are
merely permissive.2 7 This, in turn, is based upon the language of the
Evidence Convention which states that "it shall not prevent a Contracting
State from ... permitting by internal law or practices, methods of taking
evidence other than those provided for in this Convention." 28
23. Pierburg, supra note 16 at 244-245.
24. Oxman, supra note 18 at 781.
25. Id.
26. Id. It can, and should be argued that the Convention be used as a matter of judicial
self-restraint and comity regardless of the attitudes of the parties and witnesses. This is
discussed further in § III.A. infra.
27. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 608; see also Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 520
(N.D. I11. 1984); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa.
1983). Contra 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 254-255 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as RISTAU]. Ristau argues that analyzing a problem with reference to the "permissive,"
"optional," or "mandatory" character of the Convention leads to misinterpretations of interna-
tional obligations of the Contracting States. It is important, rather, to look to the obligations
between the United States and each of the individual Contracting States as a separate treaty and
to base analysis of the validity of the discovery request in issue on that ground. Id. at 254.
28. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Art. 27(c).
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This section of the Evidence Convention, however, refers to the "internal
laws or practices" of the host state. This becomes patently clear when read in
connection with another section of the same article allowing the use of less
restrictive methods for the taking of evidence under internal law or
practice.2 9 Reading these sections as modifying the internal laws of the
requesting state makes the whole Convention moot. "To allow the forum
court to supplement the Convention with its own practices would not
promote uniformity in the gathering of evidence nor generate a spirit of
cooperation among signatories... ",30 the two goals of the Convention.
31
The Convention created a set of minimum standards of judicial assistance
which the individual host countries may liberalize at will. 32 It has, therefore,
created a mandatory set of procedures which may be expanded upon.
33
E. EFFECT OF AN
ARTICLE 23 DECLARATION
Many U.S. courts, as in Anschuetz, have resisted applying the Evidence
Convention procedures where the host country has reserved the right, under
Article 23 of the Convention, to refuse to "execute Letters of Request
issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery . . .as known in
Common Law countries." 34 This reservation has been made by all signato-
ries to the Convention except the United States.35 The original purpose of
the provision, which was requested by the United Kingdom, was to prevent
discovery of "documents in the possession of [an] adversary, to aid ... in
the preparation of . . .pleadings. ."36
In practice, however, the reservation has generally been used to prevent a
"fishing expedition" carried on under the authority of the U.S. courts.
3 7
While a number of instances of abuse of discovery have occurred, the
problem underlying Article 23 lies with mistaken European notions of the
purpose, role, and conduct of discovery within the U.S.3 8 Many European
29. Id. at Art. 27(b).
30. Philadelphia Gear, supra note 13 at 60.
31. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Preamble.
32. Pierburg, supra note 16 at 244; VWAG II, supra note 13 at 859.
33. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD
IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATrERS. S. Exec. A., 92d CONG., 2d SESS. (February 1, 1972),
reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 327, 328, 331-332 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
EXPLANATORY REPORT].
34. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Art. 23.
35. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATrERS, June 12-15, 1978, reprinted in
17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1425, 1427 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT].
36. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 33 at 329.
37. See generally, In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Litigation [1978] 2 W.L.R.
81.
38. REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE
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delegates to the Convention were of the opinion that pretrial discovery in
the U.S. implies some sort of proceeding prior to institution of a lawsuit to
determine whether a suit can be supported by evidence. 39 In response to
such concerns, the U.S. delegates agreed to stress the requirement of
specificity in a Letter of Request in exchange for an agreement to reconsider
reservations under Article 23.40
The concerns of the Anschuetz court over possible rejection of a Letter of
Request, due to an Article 23 reservation by the Federal Republic of
Germany, are unfounded. 4 First, the language of the Convention is clearly
permissive on this point. The potential host state will reject a Letter of
Request only if the Letter of Request seeks unspecified evidence. Second,
further protection against wrongful rejection is built into the Evidence
Convention. The Letter may only be rejected if it does not comply with the
requirements of the Convention,42 if execution is not within the functions of
the host state's judiciary,43 or if execution would prejudice the sovereignty
or security of the host state. 4 Thus, the potential for success or failure of a
Letter of Request lies mainly with the party and court issuing the Letter.
Finally, it should be noted that in practice, Article 23 reservations have led
to infrequent refusals to execute Letters of Request in the first ten years of
operation of the Evidence Convention.45
F. THE PARTY/NON-PARTY DISTINCTION
IN APPLYING THE PROCEDURES
OF THE CONVENTION
The court in Anschuetz, although generally rejecting the use of the
Evidence Convention for discovery from foreign parties before a U.S.
court, sees it as serving an important role in taking evidence from non-party
witnesses located outside the United States. The court bases this on two
CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATrERS, 12-15 June, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417, 1422 (1978).
39. Id. at 1421.
40. Id. at 1424.
41. The Federal Republic of Germany's reservation under Article 23 states: "The Federal
Republic of Germany declares in pursuance of Article 23 of the Convention that it will not, in its
territory, execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 note (West 1984 Supp.).
Thus, it appears that any hesitation by a court to use the Evidence Convention for the taking of
depositions, due to West Germany's Article 23 reservation, would be unfounded since it is
limited to the "discovery of documents."
42. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Art. 5.
43. Id. at Art. 12(a).
44. Id. at Art. 12(b).
45. Special Commission Report, supra note 35 at 1431.
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purposes it regards as being served by the Convention. First, for the witness
who is willing to be deposed at home but cannot travel to the U.S., the
Evidence Convention provides a procedure by which the information may
be gathered with the least affront caused to the host state.46 Second, in the
case of a non-voluntary witness, the Convention provides for the host state
to use its internal laws of compulsion.47
The party/non-party distinction, however, is unknown under the Evi-
dence Convention, and is irrelevant to resolving the problems of either
Anschuetz or Falzon. Nowhere in the Convention is the line drawn between
those witnesses with a direct stake in the outcome of the litigation, and those
without such an interest. Furthermore, no commentator and no group
considering the operation of the Convention have drawn this line. Instead,
the major concern of the drafters of the Evidence Convention, and others,
has been the protection of the judicial sovereignty of the host state.48
Because such sovereignty belongs to the host state, the question of
whether one type of witness or another must comply with the Convention is
a question properly left to the internal law of the host state. 49 Ironically, in
the Federal Republic of Germany, parties to the litigation are not compe-
tent witnesses, for it is believed that they cannot be impartial in their own
case.50 While the party/non-party distinction may be applicable in U.S.
domestic litigation, it often falls apart in transnational context. Therefore,
the Anschuetz court, and others making this distinction, improperly avoid
the use of the Convention.
G. AVOIDING THE APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION BY ORDERING DISCOVERY
TO TAKE PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES
In Anschuetz, when faced with witnesses which it believed were not
subject to the Evidence Convention, the court sidestepped the issue of
judicial sovereignty altogether. 52 "If [the witnesses] are subject to the
court's jurisdiction, then the court may order that they be produced for
46. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 611 (quoting Graco, supra note 27 at 519).
47. Id.
48. REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 11TH SESSION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 785 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF U.S. DELEGATION].
49. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Art. 9.
50. Heck, Federal Republic of Germany and the E. E.C., Transnational Litigation Part II:
Perspectives from the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 793, 795 (1984).
51. See S.N.I.A., supra note 11; Graco, supra note 27 at 520-521.
52. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 611.
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deposition; violation of the other country's sovereignty is avoided by order-
ing that the deposition take place outside the country."53 (footnote omitted)
This "answer" does not solve the problem of intrusion on judicial
sovereignty in this case. As stated in Pierburg:
The foundation of the Hague Convention is to honor West Germany's civil law
jurisdiction over civil discovery concerning its nationals conducted within the
territory of West Germany. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot avoid the clear applica-
bility of the Convention by arguing that the Pierburg officers responsible for
providing answers to the discovery could leave West Germany to perform the
physical act of giving answers.
54
Judicial sovereignty, like the Evidence Convention, can only be waived or
ignored by the holder of the right to do so, i.e., the host state. Thus, the U.S.
courts again balanced chauvinistic jurisprudence in a single case over the
larger international policy considerations. 55
In the final paragraphs of its opinion in Anschuetz, the Fifth Circuit did
hold that the Evidence Convention was applicable and necessary for taking
depositions of involuntary parties located in a foreign state. 56 The court,
however, "stuck by its guns" by ordering discovery of the identity of
witnesses in Germany. It did state, however, that, should the discovery
prove too intrusive, the parties would then be ordered to proceed under the
Evidence Convention.57 Unfortunately for the U.S. party in that case, and
all future U.S. parties in transnational litigation, by that time, the damage
would already be done.
III. Proposed Solutions to the
Problems Addressed by the
United States Courts
The problems expressed by the court in Anschuetz, Falzon and other
cases concerned with the application of the Hague Evidence Convention,
may be resolved in a number of ways. One manner of resolution is to treat
the procedures of the Convention as mandatory for all U.S. litigants seeking
evidence abroad.58 While this "solution" has its own problems, it resolves
some of the conflicts expressed in many of the cases discussed in this article.
53. Graco, supra note 27 at 521; see also S.N.I.A., supra note 11; Slauenwhite v. Bekum
Maschinenfabrik, GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616 (D. Mass. 1985); Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S/S
Seatrain Bennington, 80 Civ. 1911 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
54. Pierburg, supra note 16 at 245.
55. VWAG II, supra note 13 at 857. See also Oxman, supra note 18 at 783.
56. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 615.
57. Id.
58. 1 RIsTAU, supra note 27 at 256.1.
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This section discusses a few of these solutions to the conflicts between the
procedures of the Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
similar state rules.
A. THE VWAG II Approach
The notion of international comity runs strongly through nearly all cases
such as Falzon and Anschuetz. Comity is "[t]he concept that the courts of
one sovereign state should not, as a matter of sound international relations,
require acts . . . within the territory, and inconsistent with the internal laws,
of another sovereign state unless a careful weighing of competing interests
and alternative means makes clear that the order is justified." 59 This "proce-
dure" was used by the California Court of Appeals in VWAG Hf.60 On facts
nearly identical to Falzon, the court overturned an order for depositions to
take place in Wolfsburg, Federal Republic of Germany. The court recog-
nized that under notions of internationl comity, a U.S. court cannot, and,
should not, order judicial acts which are inconsistent with the laws of a
foreign state to be performed in that state. 61
In accordance with this concept, the court recommended an approach
which is "a significant departure," 62 and is, in this author's opinion, the
answer to the major problem posed in Falzon. The court stated:
If the initial discovery order is to be validated, and if consideration of conflicts of
sovereignty is to be postponed until after the responding party has failed to give
the ordered discovery, then at least the initial discovery order must appear to take
into account the ascertainable requirements of the foreign state and adopt those
procedures which are least likely to offend that state's sovereignty.63 (emphasis
added)
The court reinforced this conclusion by stating that failure to use the least
intrusive available method would lead to the setting aside of the discovery
order.64
The key, according to the California court is for all parties to minimize
59. VWAG I1, supra note 13 at 857.
60. VWAG II, supra note 13. The court noted and adopted a balancing of interests test in
such a situation. This requires weighing principles of due process and comity, on the one hand
with the interests of the law of the forum on the other. In adopting this approach, the court
stated that where a party uses a method of discovery where another method "more apt to elicit
the cooperation of the forum government is plainly available but is not used..."the discovery
order should be set aside for failure to take full account of the comity interests. Id. at 857-858.
61. Id. at 857.
62. von Mehren, Discovery of Documentary and Other Evidence in a Foreign Country, 77
AM. J. INT'L LAW 896,898 (1983); von Mehren, Discovery Abroad: The Perspective of the U.S.
Private Practitioner, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 985, 993 (1984).
63. VWAG II, supra note 13 at 858.
64. Id.
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intrusions on sovereignty as early in the discovery process as possible. If the
VWAG II standard had been applied in Falzon, the Michigan trial judge
would have been required, on his own initiative, to limit the scope of the
ordered discovery. In the alternative, he may have required the use of the
Evidence Convention, and required the responding party to "take all possi-





Another source of innovation in the area of extraterritorial discovery is
the American Law Institute's (ALl) Restatement (Revised) of Foreign
Relations Law.66 The Restatement (Revised) strikes an effective balance
between the U.S. system and its strong need for discovery on the one hand,
and the civil law countries and their non-recognition of pretrial discovery by
parties on the other. Section 420 of the Restatement (Revised) recognizes
the right of a court to order discovery outside the United States where
authorized by treaty or by rule of court. The section, however, limits the
scope of that discovery to "documents or other information directly rel-
evant, necessary and material to an action.... 67 More importantly, the
Restatement (Revised) lays out factors to be considered by the court before
issuing an order for discovery abroad.
[A] court ... must take into account the importance to the ... litigation of the
... information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; in which of the
states involved the ... information originated; the extent to which compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the
information is located; and the possibility of alternative means of securing the
information. 68
This section of the Restatement (Revised) marks a significant departure
from prior practice in the United States. It also signals a changing attitude
toward, and a desire to cooperate with, the rest of the world. Under the
Federal Rules, generally, "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved.
,,69 Under the Restatement (Revised), a party seeking discovery abroad
must "meet a more stringent test of direct relevance, necessity and material-
ity than is required for comparable requests for. . . information located in
65. Id.
66. Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 420 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, March 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Restatement (Revised)].
67. Id., § 420(1)(a).
68. Id., § 420(1)(c).
69. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
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the United States. ,70 This requirement is reasonable in light of the civil law
procedures and the desired goals of foreign compliance with discovery
requests and admissibility of the evidence. 7'
Thus, in Anschuetz, Falzon and all similar cases, it is necessary to balance
the competing interests of the U.S. and the foreign state. In so doing,
however, it is necessary to recognize the international and comparative law
realities of the situation. Thus, in a case involving a civil law country it
is improper to claim, as the Fifth Circuit did in In re Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm GmbH that "[d]iscovery, under the Federal Rules, of documents
located in Germany need not directly involve German judicial officers.
,,72
IV. Problems with the
Proposed Solutions
A. STATUS OF THE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
IN U.S. LAW
While a great number of the problems seen in Anschuetz could have been
avoided by employing either the VWAG H or the Restatement (Revised)
approaches, these solutions are not without their faults or problems. Fed-
eral courts ruling on cases involving the Evidence Convention73 have de-
bated the question of priority between the Convention and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is generally accepted that the Federal Rules have the force of a federal
statute.74 When a statute, or in this case, the Federal Rules, comes into
conflict with a treaty or other international agreement, the last-in-time rule
applies.75 Under this rule, the treaty or statute which is most recent
prevails. 76 Even where the statute has supplanted the treaty or agreement in
domestic law, the international obligations under the treaty or agreement do
not end.77 Finally, it has been argued that the last-in-time rule should not
apply where there is a conflict between a statute and a multilateral
agreement,78 e.g., the Hague Service Convention.79
70. Restatement (Revised), supra note 66, § 420, Comment 1.
71. See id.
72. Supra note 11 at 732; see also S.N.I.A., supra note 11.
73. See generally, Murphy, supra note 21 at 361, n.2; Lasky, supra note 27 at 1228.
74. United States for Use ofTanos v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Association of Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v.
Olson, 561 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.D. 1982); Murphy, supra note 21 at 363, n. 3.
75. Vorhgrees v. Fischer & Kleche, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
76. Restatement (Revised), supra note 66 § 135 (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 1, 1980).
77. Id. § 135(c).
78. Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Restatement
(Revised), supra note 66 § 135, R.n. 3.
79. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
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The Evidence Convention was proposed by the United States following
the success of the Service Convention, 8° and is viewed by many to be
fashioned after the Service Convention. 81 The Service Convention compre-
hensively regulates the service of process among signatory states and is
recognized by the U.S. courts as supplanting the laws of service of process in
signatory states. 82 In cases concerning a conflict between the Federal Rules
and the Service Convention, the courts have consistently followed the idea
that "[tihe Hague [Service] Convention applies to all cases where service is
to be made in a foreign country and the countries involved are signatories.
S. .,83 (emphasis added).
Like the Service Convention, the Evidence Convention was designed to
comprehensively cover the taking of evidence abroad by all signatories.84
This was performed by creating a minimum standard with which all signa-
tory states must comply, with the option of allowing more liberal internal
procedures for the execution of requests originating abroad.85 While not
designed to supplant all internal discovery laws, the Evidence Convention
supplanted only those more restrictive procedural laws. By implication,
therefore, the Evidence Convention will, or should, take priority over the
Federal Rules.
Additionally, it is incumbent upon U.S. courts to construe a statute so as
to avoid conflicts with, and violation of international law and international
agreements.86 Thus, when a court finds conflict between the Federal Rules
and the Evidence Convention, every effort should be made to avoid violat-
ing the international obligations created by the ratification of the Conven-
tion by the U.S. Such efforts ought to include the exercise of judicial
self-restraint evidenced by requiring the use of the Evidence Convention, as
a matter of comity.
Civil and Commercial Matters, November 15,1965, entered intoforceforthe U.S., February 10,
1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
80. REPORT OF U.S. DELEGATION, supra note 48 at 804-805; Letter of Submittal from
Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the President Regarding the Evidence Convention, S.
Exec. A., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (February 1, 1972), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 324
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Submittal].
81. U.S. Brief, supra note 9 at 414.
82. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280,287-289 (3d Cir. 1981).
83. Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chem. Serv., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La.
1984); see also Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73,78-79 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
84. But see Club Med, supra note 12.
85. Letter of Submittal, supra note 80 at 324; REPORT OF U.S. DELEGATION, supra note 48 at
808; U.S. Brief, supra note 9 at 414.
86. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Restatement (Revised), supra note 66 § 134
(Tent. Draft No. 1).
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B. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ARGUMENT
It can be argued that VWAG II and the other cases arising out of state
courts8 7 can be explained on constitutional grounds. If one assumes that
there is a direct conflict between the Convention and the procedural rules of
the state, under the Supremacy Clause, 88 the Convention, as federal law, is
supreme. The Evidence Convention was, however, designed to comple-
ment existing procedures in the Contracting States. 89 Thus, differences in
discovery from state to state may alter the effect of the Supremacy Clause
argument.
The court in VWAG II went out of its way to base its holding on non-
constitutional grounds. The court stated that:
We could ... read the Hague [Evidence] Convention, broadly, as a preemptive
and exclusive rule of international evidence-gathering, binding . . . as the su-
preme law of the land under clause 2 of article VI of the federal Constitution. But
we ... believe that the Hague [Evidence] Convention establishes not a fixed rule
but rather a minimum measure of international cooperation .... 90
The court in VWAG H, therefore, in the face of a perfectly acceptable
means of deciding the case, opted in favor of the greater policy aims effected
by recognizing international comity-complete and fair adjudication of all
claims among them.
C. FITING THE VWAG II APPROACH INTO
THE FEDERAL RULES FRAMEWORK
Further problems arise in the federal court system when the VWAG II
approach is used. The most innovative aspect of that approach is the
requirement that the initial discovery order take all sovereignty and comity
considerations into account. 91 The problems arise under the Federal Rules
where the taking of depositions on notice, without judicial interference, is
the "order" of the day. 92 Thus, the insult or damage may occur prior to the
time any court would balance the considerations of comity.
In answer to this problem, the best solution is offered by the Federal
Rules themselves, and the Restatement (Revised). Under the 1983 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules, the judge may direct the parties to appear for a
87. Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984);
Th. Goldschmidt, supra note 16; Starcher, supra note 16. Contra Wilson v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1985).
88. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
89. Explanatory Report, supra note 33.
90. VWAG II, supra note 13 at 859.
91. Id. at 858.
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30.
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pretrial conference. 93 The conference was designed to be used for "estab-
lishing early and continuing control. . . ; [and] discouraging wasteful pre-
trial activities. "
94
The pretrial conference would, therefore, also be an ideal time to prepare
an order to obtain discovery abroad pursuant to the Restatement
(Revised).95 The court could balance the interests of the parties and issue
both the discovery order and a Letter of Request, assuming the balance
weighed in favor of obtaining the evidence from overseas. Thus, in the best
possible case, less adversarial relationships between the parties and between
the U.S. and foreign judicial systems are established at the earliest stages of
litigation, and there is a greater possibility of cooperation in later stages.
D. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
Finally, one of the most difficult problems raised by the solution of
VWAG 1196 is how to handle foreign non-compliance with a proper request
to take evidence abroad. The courts applying the Evidence Convention
seem to believe that discovery should proceed under the Convention until
such avenue is closed by the host state. 97 Only at this point should the U.S.
court impose sanctions to compel compliance.
It is argued that this "second guessing" of the actions of foreign courts
may constitute a greater intrusion into the sovereignty of the host state than
the original requests. 98 This argument, however, ignores a few major points.
First, the judicial sovereignty concerns of a civil law nation are aroused
mainly by the usurping of their judicial functions by a foreign-in this case,
U.S.--court. By issuing a Letter of Request for the taking of depositions
abroad in compliance wth the Evidence Convention, the U.S. court is
requesting the judicial assistance of the foreign court. Once the executed
Letter is returned to the U.S. court, the Convention has been fulfilled.
There is no recognized right of appeal for the requesting state nor a recog-
nized duty to prosecute or defend an appeal by the host state. 99
The burden falls on the U.S. courts to ensure compliance by the foreign
party with the good faith requirements of the Evidence Convention, ensure
its own good faith, and ensure that the trial is "less a game of blind man's
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
94. Id.
95. See text accompanying notes 68-71 (§ III.B.).
96. Supra note 13.
97. Philadelphia Gear, supra note 13 at 61; Schroeder, supra note 13 at 17,224; Th. Gold-
schmidt, supra note 16 at 445.
98. Anschuetz, supra note 11 at 613; S.N.I.A., supra note 11 (citing Anschuetz).
99. SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 35 at 1431.
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bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed.
*. .'°00 The U.S. court may, therefore, impose sanctions or request further
discovery in order to ensure the fairness of the case. As previously men-
tioned, however, this sort of situation rarely arises in practice. 1 1
Secondly, the ruling on the imposition of such sanctions is a long-standing
practice of U.S. courts. Although predominantly concerned with the failure
to disclose under threat of criminal sanctions, i.e., "blocking" statutes,
these cases can be analogized to the present situation. First of all, it must be
determined whether the problem arose with the foreign party or with the
host state. If with the host state, the foreign party will be required to petition
the Central Authority of the host state to request relaxation of the rules for
execution of foreign discovery requests, the foreign party being in the best
position to so plead. 10 2 The Supreme Court has held that given a good faith
effort by the foreign party to comply with the request, if compliance is
prevented by foreign law, then the case will not be dismissed; however, the
foreign party will not be allowed to profit by this inability to disclose. 103
A similar approach was taken by the ALI in the Restatement
(Revised).10 4 Under the Restatement (Revised), a foreign party prevented
from disclosing information due to a law or regulation of the host state "may
be required . . . to make a good faith effort to secure permission from the
foreign authorities to make the information available.'1 5 The section limits
the sanctions available to the courts and reserves to the courts the right to
make findings of fact adverse to the foreign party despite the good faith
effort to comply. 10 6 Thus, the ALl has attempted to ensure that sanctions
are imposed only after the balancing of interests swings toward the indi-
vidual U.S. litigant. Further, the sanctions are limited so as to avoid pre-
judice to either litigant.
If the failure to comply with the Letter of Request is, in whole or in part,
due to the actions of the foreign party, however, the remedies are different.
Under the Evidence Convention, compulsion is mandatory and follows the
internal laws and procedures of the host state.10 7 Thus, if compulsion is
required in a domestic proceeding in the host state, it will be applied when.
executing a Letter of Request. If compulsion is discretionary in a domestic
context, then it will also be discretionary in a transnational context. 108
100. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
101. Supra notes 37 and 45 and accompanying text.
102. Societe Internationale pour Participation Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 205 (1957).
103. Id. at 212.
104. Restatement (Revised), supra note 66 § 420(2).
105. Id., § 420(2)(a).
106. Id., § 420(2)(b), (c).
107. Evidence Convention, supra note 1, Art. 10.
108. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 33 at 334.
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V. Conclusion
The conflict continues in the U.S. courts between the discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules and the Evidence Convention. As the number of
decisions automatically resolving the conflict in favor of the Federal Rules
grows, it will become increasingly difficult for the judiciary to perform the
careful and delicate balancing of interests that comity analysis requires. The
result of such decisions is bound to be a breakdown in the underlying
principles and policies of comity, notably, the effective and complete ad-
judication of claims, and fairness.
A few U.S. courts, however, have realized that comity is a key component
in attempting to redress wrongs done to U.S. plaintiffs in transnational
disputes. The California Court of Appeals has led the way in this area. This
court, and a few federal courts, have exercised great self-restraint and have
consistently opted, as a matter of comity, to require the use of the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters over the local discovery rules, or those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Furthermore, they have required early control over extraterrito-
rial discovery in order to avoid aggravating foreign courts and governments.
It would behoove the rest of the judiciary and legal community to follow the
lead of these courts.
Change cannot, however, be a one way street. The Evidence Convention
provides ample opportunity for civil law states to liberalize their discovery
practices. Such liberalization need only affect the operation of the system in
its execution of foreign discovery requests. Absent such liberalization,
however, provisions will have to be made, by the U.S., to require foreign
corporations doing business in the U.S. to allow greater access to informa-
tion as a cost of doing business here.
Extraterritorial discovery cannot be viewed by the parties on either side as
an all-or-nothing prospect. In order to ensure cooperation and foster good
feelings among nations, both sides must be willing to give a little. Great
progress in international judicial assistance has been made; however, con-
tinuing awareness of foreign sensitivities is necessary for this progress to
continue.
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